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Municipal Ethics Remain a Hot Topic in Litigation: A
1999 Survey of Issues in Ethics for Municipal Lawyers*
Patricia E. Salkin 1

I. INTRODUCTION

Numerous decisions and opinions addressing legal ethics for local
government lawyers and non-lawyer municipal personnel were reported
in 1999. Cases and opinions addressed issues including: conflicts of interest, dual office holding, the attorney-client relationship, application of
state and government ethics laws to the legal profession, and judicial
membership on local ethics committees. 2
Local government lawyers also continue to grapple with the chilling
effects resulting from federal court decisions surrounding the issues of
confidentiality, loyalty and the government attorney-client relationship, 3
and the recent holding by the Sixth Circuit narrowing the attorney-client
privilege in the local government context. 4 While it may be true that the

Copyright © 2000 by Patricia E. Salkin.
I . Patricia E. Salkin is Associate Dean and Director of the Government Law Center of Albany Law School in Albany, New York. She is a Professor of Government Law and teaches a course
in government ethics at Albany Law School. She is the editor of ETHICAL STANDARDS IN THE PUBLIC
SECTOR: A GUIDE FOR GOVERNMENT LA WYERS, CLIENTS AND PUBLIC OFFICIALS ( 1999).
2. This article examines reported cases and opinions in 1999 dealing with all types of municipal ethics issues. For a discussion of unique ethics issues that arise particularly within the context
of municipal planning and zoning decision making, see: Patricia E. Salkin, 1998 Survey of Ethics in
Land Use Law, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1393 ( 1999); and Patricia E. Salkin, Legal Ethics and Land
Use Planninf(, 30 URB. LAW. 383 (1998).
3. See, e.fi., In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d 1100, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 996 (1998); In re Grand
Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F. 3d 910 (8th Cir. 1997). For a discussion of the impacts of these
cases, see, Paul L. Shechtman & Nathaniel Z. Marmur, Government Lawyer Confidentiality After
Lindsey, I Gov'T LAW AND POL'Y J. 30 (Fall 1999); Norman Redlich & David R. Lurie, Federal
Governmental Attorney-Client Privilefie Decisions May Prove Sifinificant to All Government Lawyers, FOOTNOTES, Winter 1998-1999; and Note, Maintaininfi the Confidence in Confidentiality: The
Application of the Attorney-Client Privilefie to Government Counsel, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1995
(1999).
4. See Reed v. Baxter, 134 F.3d 351 (6th Cir. 1998). The court held in this case that the attorney-client privilege did not protect communications between a city attorney and the city manager,
city fire chief and two city council members because the council members were deemed "third parties" and their presence waived any potential privilege. The court went on to state that even if the
attorney-client privilege exists in the municipal setting, the facts in this case did not satisfy the re-
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federal courts have placed a burden on government lawyers, one court
has stated clearly that "nothing prevents government officials who seek
completely confidential communications with attorneys from consulting
personal counsel." 5
One New York court summed up the difficulty in defining ethics and
ethical conduct at the local government level by stating, "The Constitution does not provide an ethics manual for elected local government officials."6 While it is true that no such manual exists, municipal attorneys
must be mindful of the heavy burden and responsibility in counseling
municipal clients about appropriate courses of conduct based upon constitutional, statutory, regulatory and local law provisions. Municipal attorneys must also consider the amorphous "community standards" criteria that can change overnight but make the difference between what is
and what is not acceptable behavior.
II. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

A substantial number of municipal ethics issues revolve around conflicts of interest problems. Generally, these cases are born out of a conflict of interest relating to personal financial gain, such as in the case of
contracts, employment or special considerations for family members.
Other times, the issue may be, for lawyers, one of conflicting duties
owed to clients and employers.
A. Contracts

A recent case out of Washington State illustrates the problems inherent with municipal officials who have financial interests in contracts let
out by the municipality. The elected Public Works Commissioner for the
City of Raymond (Washington State) owns a rock quarry that provides
rocks to contractors holding city contracts. 7 Concerned about a potential
conflict of interest, the Commissioner authorized, in writing, the city engineer to approve all future change orders. 8 In addition, the Commissioner sought the advice of the city attorney, who responded in writing
that precautions should be taken against possible conflicts. 9 Subsequent

quirements. See also, John Copelan, The Attorney Client Privilexe for Government Allorneys: To Be
or Not to Be? 7 PUB. LAW. I (A.B.A., Winter 1999).
5. Lindsey, 148 F.3d at 1112.
6. Masi Management, Inc. v. Town of Ogden, 691 N.Y.S.2d 706,722 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999).
7. See City of Raymond v. Runyon, 967 P.2d 19 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998), petition for review
denied 980 P.2d 1283 (1999).
8. See id. at 25.
9. See id. at 21. Specifically, the City Attorney recommended:
(I) The City should ascertain whether any pre-arrangements existed between contractors
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to his election to the position of Commissioner of Public Works, the office was abolished and the Commissioner was elected to the City Council
where, again, it was alleged that the potential for conflicts of interest was
10
present. The subject of interests in contracts for municipal officials is
covered in a Washington State statute. 11 The statute does not provide a
strict bar against having any interest in a contract. For example, a municipal officer could have an interest in a contract not exceeding $200 per
month. 12 In the case of a noncharter optional city, as was the case here, a
municipal officer may have an interest in city contracts made under the
officer's supervision not to exceed $9,000 per year. 13 Violation of the
statute voids the contract(s) as to the official's interest, subjects the official to a $300 fine, and requires forfeiture of public office. 14 The Court
determined that the Commissioner was in fact the supervisor for all contracts, a power that could not be delegated to someone else, and that contracts entered into after he assumed office violated the plain language of
the statute 15 despite the fact that he made well-intentioned attempts to
avoid conflicts of interest. 16
In Alabama, the Attorney General opined that a similar state statute 17
prohibits a member of a city utilities board, who happens to be the sole
and Runyon's (the Commissioner) business; (2) Runyon should not participate in discussions regarding any such contracts; (3) Runyon should not vote on any contracts or matters in which he operated in a fiduciary capacity; and (4) Runyon should not supervise
any contracts in which he might have a pecuniary interest.
!d.

10. See id.
ll. See WASH. REV. CODE§ 42.23 (2000).
No municipal officer shall be beneficially interested, directly or indirectly, in any
contract which may be made by, through or under the supervision of such officer, in
whole or in part, or which may be made for the benefit of his or her office, or accept, directly or indirectly, any compensation, gratuity or reward in connection with such contract from any other person beneficially interested therein.
!d. at ~ 42.23.030.
12. See id. at § 42.23.010.
13. See id. at§ 43.23.030(6). However, the officer is required to disclose the contracts by
public list, and where the municipal officer is a supplier or contractor, he or she cannot vote on the
city's contract authorization.
14. See id. at§ 42.23.050.
15. Specifically, contracts that involved the purchase of rocks in amounts that exceeded the
$9,000 statutory limit.
16. See City of Raymond v. Runyon, 967 P.2d 19,21 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998).
17. See ALA. CODE § 41-16-60 (1991 ). This statute provides:
No member or officer of the ... governing boards of instrumentalities of counties
and municipalities, including waterworks boards, sewer boards, gas boards and other
like utility boards and commissions, shall be financially interested or have any personal
beneficial interest, either directly or indirectly, in the purchase of or contract for any
personal property or contractual service, nor shall any person willfully make any purchase or award any contract in violation of the provisions of this article.
!d.
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owner of an automobile dealership, from selling cars and trucks pur18
chased by the Board, with or without bids. These types of opinions can
be frustrating for local officials, particularly those who serve in a parttime or volunteer role. While it may be true that in many cases contracts
are awarded after a competitive bidding process, the public perception of
an insider advantage would emerge if a local official won the contract. It
is this perception, the mere appearance of impropriety, which ethics laws
attempt to address.

B. Employment
Lawyers employed by local governments face a complex web of
ethical considerations that include not only state and local ethics laws,
but also the applicable code or rules of professional conduct. In a New
Jersey case, the appellate court faced the issue of whether a defendant's
constitutional right to a fair trial was violated when the defense counsel
was also employed as a part-time municipal prosecutor in the same
19
county where the trial took place. The defendant, convicted of two
counts of sexual assault and two counts of endangering the welfare of a
child, alleged that he was "unaware of his attorney's municipal employment during the trial, and that he did not learn of it until long after the
20
completion of his trial and sentence." In reversing the convictions and
remanding the case for a new trial, the court held that it is impermissible
for a part-time municipal prosecutor to represent a criminal defendant in
1
the same county where he is employed.Z In reaching this conclusion, the
court considered the potential for appearance of impropriety when measured by the frequency of antagonistic relations between a municipal
22
prosecutor and a defense attorney. The court went on to admonish that,
"[ w]hat happened here can 'undermine public confidence in our system

18. See 254 Op. Att'y Gen. Ala. 30 ( 1999).
19. See New Jersey v. Clark, 735 A.2d I (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999), cert. granted, 736
A.2d 528 ( 1999).
20. !d. at 4.
21. See id. The court noted that it was specifically refusing to follow precedent in State v.
Zold, 251 A.2d 475 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1969), aff'd, 264 A.2d 257 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1970), cert. denied, 270 A.2d 34 (N.J. 1970) because the court states that the "viability of its holding
is questionable." /d.
22. See id. The court cited, among other things, the fact that the part-time municipal prosecutors are supervised by the county prosecutor; that conflicts of interest exist since county prosecutors
often downgrade indictable offenses so they can be tried in the municipal courts, and prosecuted by
the municipal prosecutor; that municipal prosecutors may conduct probable cause hearings in the
absence of a county prosecutor; and municipal prosecutors may represent the State in a motion to
suppress evidence.
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of government and in the independence and integrity of the legal profession.'"23
Another conflict of interest arises when a public employee is also
self-employed and offers services that compete with her employer. In a
Florida case, a county health department objected to the fact that the
plaintiff, an employee of the department, was providing water-sampling
services in competition with services provided by the Department's mi4
crobiological laboratory.Z The court held that this activity violated a
Florida statute dealing with conflicting employment or contractual relationships by creating a continuing or frequently recurring conflict between the employee's private interests and the interests of the health de25
part men.t
A Connecticut statute prohibits members of a zoning board or commission from participating in decisions in which the member is directly
26
or indirectly interested in a personal or financial sense. The Connecticut
Superior Court recently applied the statute in Blinkoff v. Planning and
Zoning Commission. 27 The plaintiff, a sand and gravel company, challenged the Planning and Zoning Commission's decision to allow the applicant, a separate sand and gravel company, to continue quarry operations that had gone on for more than ten years with periodic special
exception permit renewals. The Plaintiff alleged that one of the commissioners had a personal and financial interest in the application. The
commissioner, an electrical contractor, had worked on several projects
28
with the applicant, including the applicant's office building. Holding
for the Planning and Zoning Commission, the court found that the plaintiff made a "naked assertion" without knowledge of any facts. In the
three situations where the commission member performed electrical
23.
829 (N.J.
24.
25.

/d. at 6 (citing, In re Opinion 452 of the Advisory Comm'n On Prof. Ethics, 432 A.2d
1981)).
See Velez v. Comm'n on Ethics, 739 So.2d 686, 687 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
See id. at 687-88. The Florida statute provides:
No public officer or employee of an agency shall have or hold any employment or
contractual relationship with any business entity or any agency which is subject to the
regulation of, or is doing business with, an agency of which he or she is an officer or employee, ... nor shall an officer or employee of an agency have or hold any employment
or contractual relationship that will create a continuing or frequently recurring conflict
between his or her private interests and the performance of his or her public duties or that
would impede the full and faithful discharge of his or her public duties.
FLA. STAT.~ 112.313(7)(a) (West Supp. 1999).
26. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ~ 8-11 (West 1989). This statute provides in part: "No member of
any zoning commission or board and no member of any zoning board of appeals shall participate in
the hearing or decision of the board or commission of which he is a member upon any matter in
which he is directly or indirectly interested in a personal or financial sense .... "; See also id. at ~ 821 (articulating similar language for members of planning commissions).
27. CV 980078081 S, 1999 WL 559585 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999).
28. See id. at *3.
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work involving the applicant, the commissioner's company won the job
by being the low bidder in a competitive bidding process, and that applicant did not give him the job "as a pay off for voting favorably on the
application." 29
In a separate case, the Connecticut Superior Court also considered
whether a conversation between the Chairman of the Commission and
the applicant resulted in the appearance of impropriety. 30 The court noted
that, "[l]ocal governments ... would be seriously handicapped if any
conceivable interest, no matter how remote and speculative, would re31
quire the disqualification of a zoning official." This situation demonstrates the need for communication between an applicant and the municipality, yet the management of the communication by local officials in
such as way as to not suggest the appearance of impropriety that could
undermine public trust and confidence in the integrity of the decision
making.
The Alabama Supreme Court recently held that a teacher may not
serve on a city board of education? 2 Although a plain reading of the applicable Alabama statute suggests such a scenario could occur, the court
found that such provisions could be severed from the section specifically
denying such action. 33 The court never reached the question of whether
such a situation creates a conflict of interest requiring removal under the
Alabama Code of Ethics for Public Officials. 34 Although this case really
centered on the issue of statutory construction, the possibility of a
schoolteacher serving on the board of education for the district where
he/she is employed does raise some interesting conflicts of interest issues.
In another case based on a procedural error, a North Carolina court
declined to consider the petitioners' argument that their due process
29. !d.
30. Goyette v. Lebanon Planning and Zoning Comm'n, 112654, 1999 Conn. Super. Lexis
148 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999).
31. /d.at*l5.
32. See Alabama v. Martin, 735 So. 2d 1156, 1160 (Ala. 1999). Alabama code section 16ll-2(b) provides, in part:
The members of the city board of education, who shall, except as hereinafter provided,
serve without compensation, shall be chosen solely because of their character and fitness,
but no person shall be appointed or elected to this board pursuant to this section who is
subject to the authority of the board. In cities having populations of not less than 50,000
nor more than 60,000 according to the most recent federal decennial census, and the City
of Attalla, not more than one classroom teacher employed by the board may serve as a
board member and also as a classroom teacher.
ALA. CODE§ 16-ll-2(b) (Supp. 1999).
33. See Martin, 735 So. 2d at 1160.
34. See id. It was not necessary to reach the question as the State's petition for a writ of quo
warranto was to be granted.
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rights were violated because a member of the county board of adjustment
had been employed by the county planning department and during such
employment had been consulted by the petitioners about the possibility
5
of rezoning their property? Although the petitioners raised the allegation of a conflict of interest on appeal, the court found that their due
process rights were not violated because they did not object to the member's presence on the board at the time of the hearing, and they made no
showing to the court that they were prejudiced by the member's partici. m
. the case:16
pat10n
C. Familial Relationships

Municipal decision-makers should also be wary when they are involved in municipal decisions that financially benefit a family member.
In a case challenging the granting of a competing developer's subdivision proposal, the plaintiff alleged that his competitor had significant
connections with the city council, including the fact that he was repre37
sented by the spouse of a town councilwoman. The plaintiff emphasized that the councilwoman made the motion to adopt the needed zoning
code amendments, although he concedes that she did recuse herself
months later when the applicant's project actually came before the council for a vote. 38 Basing the plaintiff's arguments on equal protection
grounds, the court declined to address the issue, stating that the question
of whether the council member labored under a conflict of interest "must
be determined under state law in a proceeding appropriate to the purpose
39
(no suggestion one way or another should be inferred here)." Thus, a
planning board itself is not necessarily infected with an alleged conflict
of interest based upon the claim that a competitor applicant was locally
favored because the competitor was represented by the spouse of a council member, especially where that council member made the motion to
adopt zoning code amendments favorable to the competitor. 40
A New York appellate court recently decided a zoning case involving familial relationships. In that case, the town board approved Cornell
41
University's rezoning application to implement a new cooling system.

35.
1999).
36.
37.
1999).
38.
39.

See JWL Invs., Inc. v Guilford County Bd. of Adjustment, 515 S.E.2d 715 (N.C. Ct. App.
See id. at 718.
See Masi Management, Inc. v. Town of Ogden, 691 N.Y.S.2d 706, 722 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.

See id.
/d.
40. See id.
41. See DePaolo v. Town of Ithaca, 694 N.Y.S.2d 235, 238 (1999).
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Although Cornell employed a town board member and a board member's
spouse, the court held that these members did not have a conflict of in42
terest that was prohibited by statute. Similarly, a third board member
who was married to a Cornell retiree did not have a prohibited conflict of
interest since the spouse's pension benefits were outside the board's control.43 The court was satisfied that none of the board members had any
direct or indirect interest, pecuniary or otherwise, in the application
"such that their vote could reasonably be interpreted as potentially bene44
fiting themselves."
Situations such as this are not uncommon, particularly in small cities
and towns where there is a major employer. Although the court found no
legal basis for a violation of ethics laws in the present case, the New
York Legislature, mindful of the appearances of these conflicts, amended
the planning and zoning enabling acts in 1998 to address situations
where conflicts may be present. The statute now allows for the appointment of alternate members to planning and zoning boards who could be
called into service when a conflict of interest prevents a regular board
· 4Smember f rom servmg.
III. WHO IS THE CLIENT OF THE GOVERNMENT LAWYER?

Government lawyers constantly grapple with the issue of who is their
46
client. For example, is the client of a county attorney the county, the
county legislative body, individual county commissioners, department
heads, or the taxpayers of the county? A recent Utah case addressed this
question when it asked whether the Salt Lake County Attorney had an
attorney-client relationship with the County Commission and with each
47
individual commissioner. Relying on the Utah Rules of Professional
Conduct, the court concluded that an elected county attorney has an at42. See id. at 240. In relying on Sections 801 and 802 of the N.Y. General Municipal Law,
the court found that "neither individual's employment duties involved the preparation, procurement
or performance of any part of the [project], nor was their remuneration directly affected by the project." !d. at 239.
43. See id.
44. !d. at 239. Also, a fourth board member was found to not have a prohibited conflict on
interest although he was a graduate student at Cornell University whose tuition and stipend were
paid for by a foundation unrelated to the Cornell and whose studies did not involve participation
with the cooling project at issue.
45. See 1998 N.Y. Laws 137 codified at: N.Y. TOWN LAW § 267 (McKinney Supp. 1998);
N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW§ 27 (McKinney Supp. 1998); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW§ 7-712 (McKinney 1996
& Supp. 1998).
46. For a detailed discussion of this issue, see Jeffery Rosenthal, Who is the Client of the
Government Lawyer?, at 13 in ETHICAL STANDARDS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR: A GUIDE FOR
GOVERNMENT LAWYERS, CLIENTS AND PUBLIC OFFICIALS, (Patricia E. Salkin ed., 1999); see also
Reed v. Baxter, 134 F.3d 351 (6°' Cir. 1998).
47. See Salt Lake County Comm'n v. Short, 985 P.2d 899,901 (1999).
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torney-client relationship only with the county as an entity. 48 In considering other state laws to determine whether there was any contradictory directives, the court examined the statutory mandates for county attorneys.49 The court found nothing explicit in these statutes to suggest that
the county attorney has an attorney-client relationship with each individual commissioner or with the commission as a group of individuals. 50
The court further found that the county attorney has a dual role: 1) to
act as an attorney for the county; and 2) to carry out her statutory duties
as an elected official. As such, the duties given to the county attorney
may create a conflict among the attorney, the commission and the commissioners.51 In addressing the question of when a county commission
may hire outside counsel, the court determined that "the County must be
represented by the elected attorney in all matters falling within the scope
of the attorney-client relationship unless that person cannot act, either
because of a refusal to do so, an incapacity, or a disqualification, as by a
52
conflict of interest." Such a determination is fact-intensive, and the
court reminded the parties that there are three ways to resolve these issues: I) the parties may settle the matter among themselves; 2) the parties may appeal to the Attorney General's office for an opinion; or, 3) as
in the case at bar, the parties may resort to the courts by seeking a de53
claratory judgment.
IV. JURISDICTION OF ETHICS INVESTIGATIONS WITH RESPECT TO
MUNICIPAL LAWYERS

Determination of jurisdiction in ethics investigations can be difficult
when the investigated attorney also holds a municipal office. The Penn-

48. See id. at 902. See also UTAH RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 1.13(f) (2000).
This rule provides that any "lawyer elected ... to represent a governmental entity shall be considered for the purpose of this rule as representing an organization. The government lawyer's client is
the governmental entity except as the representation or duties are otherwise required by law." /d.
Rule 1.13(a) states that "[a]lawyer retained or employed by an organization represents the organization through its duly authorized constituents." /d.
49. Prior to 1993, the Utah Code stated that the "county attorney is the legal adviser of the
board of county commissioners." UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-18-2 (1995). This section was amended to
read, "[t]he county attorney is the legal adviser of the county. He must attend meetings of the county
legislative body when required, and must oppose all claims and accounts against the county when he
deems them unjust or illegal." /d. at* 17-18-2 (1999). The Utah Code also directs the county attorney to "give, when required and without fee, an opinion in writing to county, district, precinct, and
prosecution district officers on matters relating to the duties of their respective offices." /d. at §1718-1.5(5)(c). Finally, the Utah Code states that the county commission "may control and direct the
prosecution and defense of all actions to which the county is a party." /d. at§ 17-5-219.
50. See Short, 985 P.2d at 905.
51. See id.
52. /d. at 907.
53. See id.

218

B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 14

sylvania Supreme Court held that its exclusive jurisdiction to regulate
ethical and professional conduct of attorneys does not prohibit the State
54
Ethics Commission from investigating the city solicitor's activities. The
investigation centered on the lawyer's representation of the city through
55
his private law firm while simultaneously serving as City Solicitor. 56
After determining that a solicitor is in fact a public official or public em57
ployee for purposes of applicability of the State Ethics Act, the court
reached the constitutional issue of the separation of powers claim between the judiciary and the executive branch. In a strong affirmation of
the power of the State Ethics Commission to investigate alleged wrongdoing on the part of municipal attorneys, the court stated, "[a]ppellant
attempts to use his status as a member of the Bar of Pennsylvania as a
shield protecting him from investigation by the Ethics Commission." 58 In
characterizing the solicitor's argument as "absurd" the court reiterated
that while it does have exclusive jurisdiction over the conduct of lawyers
as it applies equally to all members of the Bar, this jurisdiction "is not
infringed when a regulation aimed at conduct is applied to all persons,
59
and some of those persons happen to be attorneys."

54. See P.J. S. v. State Ethics Comm'n, 723 A.2d 174, 178 (Pa. 1999). Specifically at issue
was a ethics statute that provided, in part:
(a) No public official or public employee shall engage in conduct that constitutes a conflict of interest.
(f) No public official or public employee or his spouse or child or any business in which
the person or his spouse or child is associated shall enter into any contract valued at $500
or more with the governmental body with which the public official or public employee is
associated or any subcontract valued at $500 or more with any person who has been
awarded a contract with the governmental body ....
65 PA. CONS. STAT. § I 103(a),(f) (2000). Although not at issue in the case, findings were made by
the State Ethics Commission alleging that the solicitor used city equipment, staff and materials in
pursuing his outside legal practice. P.J.S., 723 A.2d at 175 n.3.
55. Although the lawyer was employed full-time by the city, he had an agreement with the
mayor that since he could have flexible hours, he may be able to maintain a private Jaw practice as
well as fulfilling his city appointment. See id. at 175.
56. See id.
57. See id. The court determined that the solicitor was an employee under Section II 03 of the
Ethics Act which defines a public employee as:
Any individual employed by the commonwealth or political subdivision who is responsible for taking or recommending official action of a nonministerial nature with regard to:
(I) contracting or procurement; (2) administering or monitoring grants or subsidies; (3)
planning or zoning; (4) inspecting, licensing, regulating or auditing any person; or (5) any
other activity where the official action has an economic impact of greater than a de
minimus nature on the interests of any person.
65 PA. CONS. STAT.§ 1103 (2000).
58. P.J.S., 723 A.2d at 178.
59. /d.
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V. DUAL OFFICE HOLDING

The issues surrounding dual office holding regularly arise in small,
more rural municipalities where it can be difficult to recruit willing volunteers into public service. It can also arise where one person simultaneously holds two public sector jobs in an effort to earn a full-time salary.
In some situations an intentional decision is made to have a local official
serve on another official board for the purposes of information exchange
and continuity. Whatever the reasons for dual-office holding, the situation often creates appearance problems for the office holders.
The Superintendent of the Recreation Services Division of the City
of Stamford (Connecticut) directed an employee not to accept additional
part-time employment as a referee or umpire for various local athletic
events sponsored by the city. 60 Although the employee did not directly
assign officials to the various games, two employees supervised by him
61
were responsible for the assignments. The Superior Court upheld the
superintendent's directive, which further stated that the employee's actions represented "a practice that does not present the proper image that I
62
want the Department to have." The employee had a letter from the local
board of ethics opining that his refereeing of city-sponsored games did
63
not constitute either a real or apparent conflict of interest. However, the
court felt that the issue was not whether the employee was accused of
unethical conduct, but "whether the city is justified in prohibiting him
from conduct that the plaintiff's supervisor believes gives her division an
64
undesirable image in the community."
A similar decision by the Michigan Court of Appeals held that a
township trustee could not also be the county delinquent personal property tax coordinator because the offices were incompatible under the Incompatible Offices Act. 65 The trustee had discussed and voted on
whether the township should contract with the county for the county to

60. See Troy v. City of Stamford, CV 990169739, 1999 Conn. Super. Lexis 1456 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999).
61. See id. at * l-2.
62. !d. at *2-3.
63. See id. at *2. Actually, even though the teams paid the referees and not the city, there had
been allegations that the employee was getting choice assignments based upon his city employment
status.
64. !d. at *6.
65. See MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN.§ 15.182 (West 1994) (providing that, "a public officer or
public employee shall not hold 2 or more incompatible offices at the same time."); !d. at§ 15.181(b)
(defining incompatible offices as, "public offices held by a public officials which, when the official
is performing the duties of any of the public offices held by the officials, results in any of the following with respect to the offices held: (i) The subordination of I public office to another. (ii) The supervision of l public office by another. (iii) A breach of duty of public office.").
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provide collection services for delinquent personal property taxes. 66 The
court ordered the official to resign from one of her offices stating,
"[a]bstaining from any official action in an attempt to avoid the incompatibility does not remedy a breach of duty; vacating one of the offices is
the only solution to the problem."67
The official also claimed that the county prosecutor had acted in direct conflict with his statutory duty to give advice and counsel to the
county treasurer when he filed the discretionary action seeking her removal. The official also brought allegations that such action on the part
of the county prosecutor violated the Michigan Rules of Professional
Conduct. 68 The court dismissed these arguments stating, "indeed, if we
accept defendant's argument, it is questionable whether the prosecutor
could prosecute an employee of the treasurer's office for embezzlement,
should the situation present itself."69
The Kentucky Court of Appeals examined whether the same person
could serve on both the local legislative body and on the county planning
commission. 70 After reviewing compatibility provisions in the State Constitution71 and statute, 72 and considered the common-law of incompatibility of dual office-holding, the court held that the two positions present an
inherent conflict of interest with respect to zoning matters. 73 In concluding that the two offices were "functionally incompatible," the court
found that both due process and public policy prohibit the simultaneous
service. 74 The court also rejected the notion that abstention from the vote

66. See Macomb County Prosecutor v. Murphy, 592 N.W.2d 745 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999).
67. /d. at 748.
68. Although rule 1.7 of the Michigan Rules of Professional Conduct prohibits a lawyer from
representing one client if the representation will be directly adverse to another client, or if the representation may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or third person,
or by the lawyer's own interest, Rule 1.13 states that when a lawyer represents an organization, the
lawyer represents the organization "as distinct from its directors, officers, employees, members,
shareholders, or other constituents." MICHIGAN RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCf, Rule 1.13(a)
(1999).
69. Macomb County Prosecutor, 592 N.W.2d. at 751.
70. See Lagrange City Council v. Hall Bros. Co, Inc., 3 S.W.3rd 765 (Ky. Ct. App. 1999).
71. Section 165 of the Kentucky Constitution provides:
No person shall, at the same time, be a State officer or a deputy officer or member
of the General Assembly, and an officer of any county, city, town or other municipality,
or an employee thereof; and no person shall, at the same time, fill two municipal offices,
either in the same or different municipalities, except as may be otherwise provided in this
Constitution.
KYCONST. § 165.
72. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 61.080 (Michie 1998) (enumerating twelve offices it deems
incompatible).
73. See Latvange, 3 S.W.3rd at 770.
74. /d.
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at the planning commission level would remedy the conflict between the
75
two positions.
In Michigan, a state statute specifically allows for one member of a
township planning commission to simultaneously serve on the township's zoning commission. 76 The Michigan Attorney General, however,
opined that it is a violation of the Incompatible Public Offices Act77 for
more than one member of a township planning commission to simultaneously serve as a member of the township's zoning board of appeals. The
zoning board of appeals reviews decisions of the planning commission,
and the planning commission could influence the actions of a member of
the zoning commission, thereby creating the possibility of a breach of
public duty. 78 Based upon the analysis in the most recent opinion, it remains peculiar that the legislature continues to authorize dual membership for one member of the planning commission/zoning board of appeals.
Modifying a previous opinion, 79 the Ohio Attorney General opined
that since Ohio law permits zoning commissions to organize in such way
as to have its members also serve as secretary of the commission on a rotating basis, it is within the discretion of the board of township trustees to
0

0

75. See id. at 771. Furthermore, even though the council member abstained from the vote
below, he did take part in the discussions at the meetings of both bodies and he voted on the matter
when it was before the second body for consideration. Interestingly, the court then went on to absolve the council member from any personal unethical conduct by stating:
There is absolutely no evidence in the record to indicate that Hoffman has any personal
or financial interest in the outcome of the vote of the proposed zoning map amendment.
Furthermore, Hoffman's decision to abstain from the vote before the Planning Commission demonstrates a desire to avoid any appearance of impropriety. We merely hold that
public policy mandates that Hoffman cannot simultaneously hold positions as a member
of the City Council and of the Planning Commission.
/d.

76. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 125.331, 125.288(1) (West 1997). This dual office
holding has been upheld by the Michigan Attorney General in previous opinions where the Attorney
General stated, among other things, "[t]he Legislature may, of course, expressly authorize the simultaneous holding of two public offices that would otherwise be incompatible." 1995-1996 Mich. Op.
Att'y Gen. No. 6837 (1995). See also, 1985-1986 Mich. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 6268 (1985).
77. The Act defines "incompatible office" as:
Incompatible office" means public offices held by a public official which, when the official is performing the duties of any of the public offices held by the official, results in any
of the following with respect to those offices held:
(i) The subordination of I public office to another.
(ii) The supervision of I public office by another.
(iii) A breach of duty of public office.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §15.18l(b) (West 1994).
78. See 1999 Mich. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 7012.
79. See 1957 Ohio Op. Atty. Gen. No. 1052 which, relied on an earlier version of the state
statutes (R.C. 519 .05) opined that "public policy prohibits a commission member from being paid to
perform the duties of commission secretary if the latter position is a salaried position under the authority of the commission on which the member serves." /d.
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determine whether and what amount of additional compensation may be
paid to the member serving as secretary at each meeting. 80 While the dual
office holding question has long been settled as not a violation of an
ethical standard, the question of additional compensation to board members for performing the additional record-keeping tasks was a new matter. Since it was not the zoning commission that set the compensation, it
was discretionary with another body, and because the zoning commission
members rotated the responsibility, the Attorney General found no im.
81
propnety.
The New Jersey Supreme Court has granted review to consider
whether an attorney may simultaneously serve as a municipal attorney
and borough clerk/administrator for the same municipality, 82 and whether
a municipal planning board attorney may also serve as a public defender
in the same municipality. 83
VI. MEMBERSHIP ON LOCAL ETHICS COMMITTEES
The Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee for the State of Delaware
advised a superior court judge that he must decline an invitation to serve
as chair (as well as declining membership) of a school district's ethics
84
review committee. After considering relevant Cannons of the Delaware
Judges' Code of Judicial Conduct, 85 the Committee indicated concern
that the work of the ethics review committee could become controversial
and might ultimately result in litigation in the superior court. 86 The
Committee opined that although in such circumstances, the judge could
recuse himself from any such cases, the potential option of future judicial
recusal did not justify service on the local ethics review commission. 87

80. See 1999 Ohio Op. Atty. Gen. 99-035 (1999).
81. See id.
82. See In the Matter of the Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics, 736 A.2d 522

(1999).
83. See In re: Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics, ACPE Docket No. 1-99, 1999
N.J. LEXIS 1182 (N.J. 1999).
84. See In re Your April20, 1999 Request for an Opinion from the Judicial Ethics Advisory
Committee, JEAC 1999-1, 1999 WL 743525 (Del. Super. Ct. 1999).
85. Including: Cannon 2, "A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities"; Canon 4, "A judge may engage in activities to improve the law, the legal system, and the administration of justice"; and Cannon 5, "A judge should regulate extra-judicial activities to minimize the risk of conflict with judicial duties."
86. See In re Your April20, 1999 Request for an Opinion from the Judicial Ethics Advisory
Committee, JEAC 1999-1, 1999 WL 743525 (Del. Super. Ct. 1999).
87. See id.
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Vll. ELECTIONS
An attorney who is "of counsel" to the law firm of the attorney representing an unsuccessful candidate for the office of mayor is not eligible
to make the required certification of a practicing attorney that an independent assessment of the claim has been made. 88 Certification is required in Mississippi by two practicing attorneys that each has, "fully
made an independent investigation into the matters of fact and law upon
which the protest and petition are based and that after such investigation
they verily believe that the said protest and petition should be sustained
and that the relief prayed therein should be granted." 89 After discussing
the definitions and roles of attorneys who have "of counsel" relationships
with law firms, the court concluded, "[g]iven the close, regular, personal
relationship between attorney and law firm contemplated by the ABA
where the 'of counsel' designation is employed ... an attorney listed as
being 'of counsel' on the letterhead of the firm representing the contestant ... is not eligible to make the certification required by the Election
Code." 90
VITI. BAD FAITH

The issue of ill-conceived motivations or bad-faith on the part of local officials may properly be viewed as a question of ethics or ethical
conduct by those vested with the public trust. The cases where these allegations, correctly or incorrectly, are being made appear to be growing
at an alarming rate and should signal both a warning and a cause for concern to local officials. For example, in a Wisconsin case, petitioners
claimed that they were denied a fair and impartial hearing when, after a
4-1 vote to approve the petition for a reclassification by the county planning and survey committee, the Chair of the Committee erroneously represented to the county board of supervisors that the vote had been 3-2,
that she voted against it (she did not). 91 Furthermore, prior to the vote by
the board of supervisors, the Chair of the Town Board was alleged to
have made the following misrepresentations: that the petitioners were
real estate developers who had ulterior motives; that the town residents
were anti-development; and that she failed to correctly state the reasons

88.
89.
90.
91.

Esco v. Scott 735 So.2d 1002 (Miss. 1999).
/d. (citing 7 ANN. MISS. CODE § 23-15-927 (West 1999)).
/d. at 1005.
See Thorp v. Town of Lebanon, 593 N.W.2d 878 (Wis. 1999).
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92

in the petition for their request. Although the claim was dismissed on
93
procedural grounds, the allegation of bias and the resulting public perception of the conduct of local officials in these situations goes a long
way to erode the public trust.
In another case, an alleged equal protection violation by an applicant
that a competing developer was locally favored and that the other applicant was represented by the spouse of a town council member did not
contain sufficient evidence to prove that, "selective treatment was based
on impermissible or discriminatory animus against a cognizable group or
class of individuals, or that plaintiff was maliciously singled out for disparate treatment because of the exercise of constitutional rights, or bad
94
faith intent to injure plaintiff." As the court correctly points out, the
federal circuit courts are not in agreement on the issue of whether evidence of malicious or bad faith intent to injure will support an equal pro95
tection claim. The United States Supreme Court has an opportunity,
however, to provide further guidance with the granting of certiorari in
I 999 of the Olech case arising out of the 7th circuit. 96
A claim based upon prejudice and bias as a reason for failing to exhaust administrative remedies was not supported where the crux of the
allegation was that a hearing now by the people appointed to fill vacancies on the Board of Adjustment after the filing of the litigation would be
futile since, "any Board formed would be comprised of individuals who
were prejudiced and biased against the Petitioner and therefore would be
97
predisposed to rule against him." In fact, the record revealed that the
three individuals appointed to fill vacancies were not part of any opposition to the application, nor did they participate in the matter in any other
forum, leaving nothing to suggest that they would act other than impar. ll y. 98
t1a

92. See id. at 882.
93. The petitioners filed a federal claim alleging a deprivation of due process. but they failed
to assert their state claim remedy which rested with a certiorari review.
94. Masi Management, Inc. v. Town of Ogden, 691 N.Y.S.2d 706, 722 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999).
95. See id. at 902, reciting a string of conflicting circuit court cases.
96. See Olech v. Village of Willowbrook, 160 F.3d 386 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. granted,_
U.S._, 120 S. Ct. 10 (1999).
97. Cheswold Aggregates v. Town of Cheswold, No. 99M-02-0009HDR, 1999 WL 743339
(Del. Super. Ct. 1999).
98. See id. at *2 (quoting Phillips v. Board. of Educ. of Smyra Sch. Dist., 330 A.2d 151, 154
(Del. Super. Ct. 1974)). 'There is a presumption that public officials discharge their duties and perform the acts required of them by law in accordance with the law and the authority conferred upon
them and that they act fairly, impartially and in good faith." !d.
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IX. CONCLUSION

With more than two dozen reported cases and optmons in 1999
where the central issue was ethical conduct of a local government official, government lawyers need to continue to meet the challenge of keeping current on trends on the field of government ethics. There is no treatise on government ethics, no national newsletter devoted exclusively to
the field, nor a web site where these types of cases and opinions are typically summarized and searchable. Thus, government lawyers must be
creative in their research path and mindful of jurisdictional differences in
the law and in community values and standards that have so much to do
with determining whether the conduct complained of is in fact unethical.
Government lawyers need to be proactive and play a leadership role in
the training of municipal officials about the wide array of potential ethics
99
allegations, demonstrated through the microcosm of a look at the types
of cases and matters arising in 1999 and reported in this article.

99. For a discussion of easy strategies for lawyers that are designed to educate local officials
on ethics issues see, Patricia E. Salkin, Ten Effective Strategies for Counseling Municipal Clients on
Ethics Issues, 22 STATE & LoCAL LAW NEWS I (Fall 1998).

